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Abstract: Kenneth Burke’s logology is a way of thinking about how to understand the use
of language—what he calls “symbolic action”—and how to use language to make
sense of various human practices, including interpretive acts. This is a dialectic in
thought between rhetoric as language-use and interpretation as making-sense. In
The Rhetoric of Religion Burke’s theotropic logology uses theology to interpret
symbolic action and symbolic action to interpret theology. Burke extends to other
interpretive projects this same rhetorical-hermeneutic strategy of analogically
translating words from one domain into another, from one meaning into another.
This strategy is one way Burke thinks with other authors and their texts. The
present essay uses some of Burke’s published and unpublished work to show how
he thinks with the Christian Existentialism of Nicholas Berdyaev and Fyodor
Dostoevsky, especially on the topic of freedom. In his thinking with Berdyaev,
Burke agrees with the Russian theo-philosopher about the importance of freedom.
Indeed, the act of freedom, dramatized in Dostoevsky and described by Berdyaev,
forms the very center of Burke’s theory of symbolic action, his Dramatism and
ultimately his Logology. Freedom is the condition of possibility for human action
as opposed to mere motion, and free will is the necessary product of the cycle of
terms implicit in the idea of hierarchical order presented in Burke’s The Rhetoric
of Religion.
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Стивен МАЙУ

ПО СЛЕДАМ МЫСЛИ ХРИСТИАНСКОГО
ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛИЗМА: СВОБОДА В ЛОГОЛОГИИ
БЕРКА И У ДОСТОЕВСКОГО
В ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИИ БЕРДЯЕВА
Аннотация: Логология Кеннета Берка – попытка приблизиться к пониманию того,
как люди используют язык (Берк называет это «символическим действием»),
и как использовать язык, чтобы осмыслять различные аспекты человеческой
деятельности, в том числе акт интерпретации. Это диалектическая мысль,
в которой сходятся риторика как способ использования языка и интерпретация как акт осмысления. В «Риторике религии» Берк опирается на свою
тяготеющую к религии логологию для толкования символических действий
и на символические действия – для толкования теологии. Ту же риторико-герменевтическую стратегию, предполагающую перенос слов по аналогии из одной сферы в другую, от одного значения к другому, Берк проецирует
и на другие виды интерпретации. Такая тактика – один из способов Берка
думать вместе с другими авторами и их текстами. В настоящем эссе на материале некоторых опубликованных и неопубликованных работ Берка показано, как он следует за мыслью христианского экзистенциализма Николая
Бердяева и Ф.М. Достоевского, особенно за их размышлениями о свободе.
Следуя за мыслью Бердяева, Берк соглашается с утверждением русского
религиозного философа о значимости свободы. Сам акт свободы, художественно изображенный Достоевским и описанный Бердяевым, составляет
сердцевину сформулированной Берком теории символического действия, его
драматизма и, в конечном счете, его логологии. Свобода – необходимое условие действия человека в противовес механическому движению, а свободная
воля – логичный вывод из циркуляции понятий, которая заложена в иерархии,
представленной Берком в «Риторике религии».
Ключевые слова: Кеннет Берк, Николай Бердяев, Ф.М. Достоевский, свобода, логология, теология/богословие, риторическая герменевтика
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“If we defined ‘theology’ as ‘words about God,’ then by ‘logology’
we should mean ‘words about words.’” So begins Kenneth Burke’s
introduction to his 1961 book The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology.
Burke goes on to argue ingeniously for a series of analogies between
these two realms, developing thereby what might be called his rhetorical
hermeneutics of thinking. By rhetorical hermeneutics I mean to suggest
a dialectic in thought between rhetoric as language-use and interpretation
as making-sense.1 Burke’s logology is a way of thinking about how to
interpret the use of language—what he famously calls “symbolic action”—
and how to use rhetoric to make sense of various human practices, including
interpretive acts. In The Rhetoric of Religion Burke’s theotropic logology
uses theology to interpret symbolic action and symbolic action to interpret
theology. More specifically, Burke places under the heading of rhetoric the
whole subject of religion since “religious cosmogonies are designed . . .
as exceptionally thoroughgoing modes of persuasion” for interpreting the
universe, and he creatively uses statements in religion about the nature of
God as “purely secular observations on the nature of words.” 2 Emphasizing
the latter interpretive strategy, Burke contends that “insofar as religious
doctrine is verbal, it will necessarily exemplify its nature as verbalization;
and insofar as religious doctrine is thorough, its ways of exemplifying
verbal principles should be correspondingly thorough.”3 That is, studying
words about God will provide us with many words about words.
In finding analogies between theology and logology, Burke
remains agnostic concerning the truth of religious faith. “For regardless of
whether the entity named ‘God’ actually exists outside his nature sheerly as
key term in a system of terms, words ‘about him’ must reveal their nature
1

See Mailloux, Steven. Rhetoric’s Pragmatism: Essays in Rhetorical Hermeneutics.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2017. For additional examples
and commentary, see Reconceptualizing American Literary/Cultural Studies: Rhetoric,
History, and Politics in the Humanities, ed. William E. Cain. New York: Garland, 1996;
Reception Study: From Literary Theory to Cultural Studies, eds. James L. Machor and
Philip Goldstein. New York: Routledge, 2001; Майу, Стивен. “Сравнение: первая
встреча, этноцентризм и межкультурная коммуникация.”, trans. D. Kharitonov.
Ценности, каноны, цены, ed. Tatiana Venediktova. Moscow: Moscow University Press,
2005: 14–29 (In Russ.); Drong, Leszek. Disciplining the New Pragmatism: Theory,
Rhetoric, and the Ends of Literary Study. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007; and Mailloux,
Steven. “Rhetoric.” The Bloomsbury Handbook of Literary and Cultural Theory, ed.
Jeffrey R. Di Leo. London: Bloomsbury, 2019: 102–111.
2
Burke, Kenneth. The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology [1961]. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1970: v, 1.
3
Ibid.: 1.
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as words.” The “linguistic analogue” to the concept of God can be found,
according to Burke, “in the nature of any name or title” that “sums up
a manifold of particulars under a single head (as with the title of a book, or
the name of some person or political movement). Any such summarizing
word is functionally a ‘god-term.”4 He elaborates this analogy elsewhere by
summing up his approach: “Whereas Anselm propounded the ‘ontological
necessity for the existence of God,’ we base our position on the analogous
linguistic necessity for the existence of god-terms. . . . And insofar as
man, the word-using animal, approached nonverbal nature in terms of his
humanly verbalizing nature, is there not a sense in which nature must be as
much of a linguistically inspirited thing for him as super-nature?”5
Here Burke gestures toward the larger logological framework of
terminological orders across which human beings make analogies in their
symbol-using. He explains that “there are four realms to which words
may refer”: natural, verbal, socio-political, and supernatural. Humans are
constantly borrowing words from one realm to refer in another, moving,
for instance, from the socio-political to the natural (“the king of the jungle”
for lion) and back again, the natural to the socio-political (“the lion in
winter” for Henry II of England). But Burke especially emphasizes the
borrowings for the supernatural order: “Even if one assumed it as beyond
question that there really is a realm of the supernatural, nevertheless our
words for the discussion of this realm are necessarily borrowed by analogy
from our words for the other three orders: the natural, the socio-political
and the verbal (or the symbolical in general, as with the symbol-systems of
music, the dance, painting, architecture, the various specialized scientific
nomenclatures, etc.).”6 Burke visually represents this particular point about
4

Ibid.: 2–3.
Burke, Kenneth. “What Are the Signs of What? A Theory of ‘Entitlement.’”
Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1966: 378. Though still thinking analogically, Burke had
earlier defined god-terms a bit differently as “names for the ultimates of motivation” and
gave the examples of “freedom” and “necessity,” describing the concepts as the “two
primary generalizations that characterize the quality of motives.” A few pages later he
notes that interpretations of action can be revised by freely choosing to change the scenic
circumference of an action, giving an example from The Brothers Karamazov, where the
mystic Alyosha “‘negates’ the terms of the scene as Mitya interpreted it.” Alyosha reads
his brother’s romance through the “higher synthesis” of transcendent religion. Burke,
Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives [1945]. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1969: 74, 84–85.
6
Burke, Kenneth. Rhetoric of Religion: 15.
5
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terminological dependency with the vertical line in the following diagram7
separating the supernatural from the other three realms:

In The Rhetoric of Religion Burke focuses on “the analogy between
‘words’ (lower case) and The Word (Logos, Verbum) as it were in caps.”8
The analogical translation again works both ways as secular words from the
socio-political order are used in the supernatural order and then borrowed
back from the supernatural to the aesthetic within the social (gratis, grace).
Burke extends to other interpretive projects this same rhetoricalhermeneutic strategy of analogically translating words from one location
into another, from one meaning into another. Indeed, this strategy is
one significant way Burke thinks with other authors and their texts.
In the present essay I would like to use some of Burke’s published and
unpublished work to show how he thinks with the Christian Existentialism
of Nicholas Berdyaev and Fyodor Dostoevsky, especially about the topic
of freedom.

* * *
In July 1956 the theologian Stanley Hopper of Drew University
invited Burke to give a lecture in the school’s Graduate Colloquium during
the next academic year and also asked Burke to review Christianity and the
Existentialists for the Drew Gateway. Burke accepted both invitations.9 He
proposed “Words and the Word” for his lecture, gave it in December 1956,
and eventually revised it into the first chapter of The Rhetoric of Religion.
The plan for the book review apparently did not go as well. There is still
7
Reproduced from Burke, Kenneth. “What Are the Signs of What?” Language
as Symbolic Action. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1966: 374. I thank
Anthony and Michael Burke for permission to reproduce Burke’s chart of terministic
pyramids and to quote from Burke’s unpublished material. I would also like to thank
them and Julie Whitaker once again for their kind hospitality during my visits to the
Burke summer home in Andover, New Jersey, as well as Jack and Linda Selzer for their
support in making such visits possible.
8
Burke, Kenneth. Rhetoric of Religion: 7.
9
Stanley Hopper to Kenneth Burke, 16 July 1956, and Burke to Hopper, 27 July
1956, Kenneth Burke Papers, Special Collections Library, Pennsylvania State University
Libraries, State College.
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a marked up copy of Christianity and the Existentialists in his personal
library at the Burke family compound in Andover, New Jersey, and among
his papers at the house are some typed pages and handwritten notes for
a review of the book. 10 But Burke probably never completed the review. In
any case no published version appeared in the Drew Gateway during the
next few years.11
Burke begins his typescript comments in praise of metaphysics
and theology, not as truthful accounts of ultimate realities but as “reasoned
utterances [that] can be admired for their thoroughness or scope, their
great dialectical finesse, the meditative note they bring to our problems
of existence,” and most notably “the enterprise they show in discovering
just what does happen if one takes a set of key terms, and is exceptionally
persistent in following where they lead.” Burke argues that humans as
symbol-using animals “can never become too sophisticated” in studying
their own symbol-systems, “which play such a crucial role in guiding
and misguiding.” Logology is the name for such study as it turns back
upon itself as words about words. “‘Logologically’ speaking, this word”
logology is “to thoughts about language, what ‘thought about thought’
and ‘self-consciousness’ are to Aristotelian and Hegelian metaphysics
respectively” (ts1).
For Burke, Christianity and the Existentialists is full of “logological
wonders,” which he goes on to describe in the remaining pages of the
typescript. Some of these wonders involve explicit statements Existentialism
makes about language and human existence; others are implicit proposals
Burke teases out of Existentialist discourse through his rhetoricalhermeneutic strategy of translating philosophical words and assertions into
his own vocabulary and logological arguments. Burke quotes Michalson’s
introduction, “Hereafter, a philosophy which does not deliberately retain
in its method the distinction between reality as engaged by one’s whole life
and reality as thought, between attitude toward reality and content about
reality, cannot be regarded as an existential philosophy.”12 Burke then asks,
10
The nine-page typescript and additional handwritten notes are contained in an
envelope at Andover marked “N19” and labeled “‘Christianity & the Existentialists’
notes.” The pages of the typescript will hereafter be cited in the main text as “ts” followed
by page number.
11
There is also no such review in the “Philosophy” section of Burke, Kenneth.
Equipment for Living: The Literary Reviews of Kenneth Burke, eds. Nathaniel A. Rivers
and Ryan P. Weber. West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press, 2010.
12
Michalson, Carl. “What Is Existentialism?” Christianity and the Existentialists,
ed. Carl Michalson. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1956: 5.
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“Do we not here confront the basic methodological problem” that humans
must inevitably confront as symbol-using animals? “Every ‘philosophy’
must, by its very nature as a philosophy, be a structure of words. Yet most
of our empirical existence is non-verbal, or extra-verbal” (ts2). Burke goes
on to develop this point by noting that “by ‘existence,’ the Existentialist
presumably has in mind this disproportion between the non-verbal and the
verbal (the verbal being the realm of ‘essence,’ as distinct from ‘existence,’
since the verbal is the realm of definition, with all its hazards)” (ts3).
Burke welcomes Michalson’s paragraphs on “the special
terminology that a philosophy may need” and gathers together the terms
of Existentialist discourse: “‘Humiliating consciousness of their ignorance
. . . guilt and death . . . moral burden . . . wonder . . . curiosity . . . doubt
. . . despair . . . hope of rescue . . . interior agony . . . anxiety . . .’” (ts4,
ellipses in original). Burke then logologically observes that “such terms
lead into talk of the ‘galaxy of meanings,’” clustering around the term
existence. Turning to the relation of Existentialism to Christianity, Burke
wonders whether the absence of a chapter on Jean-Paul Sartre was an error
and then quickly moves to the penultimate paragraph of the introduction,
which reads in part:
If a philosophy can ever do anything to prepare the way for the Christ in our
culture today, will it not be the very philosophy which refuses to supplant
him? Existentialism nurses an aching void, keeps the wounds of man open
until an authentically healing agent can be applied. Existentialism sponsors
what the poet Hölderlin called ‘a holy emptiness’ which turns its atheism
into a wistful stretching out for reality, a noumenal hunger, a movement of
the spirit which keeps a sensitive openness upward toward the God who
must reveal Himself if He is to be known.13

Burke comments by translating Michalson’s translation: we end here “on
post-Kantian language, translating Hölderlin’s ‘holy emptiness’ into ‘noumenal hunger,’ which perhaps [can] best be trabslated [sic] logologically:
‘How see without seeing in terms of sight, how hear without hearing in
terms of sound, etc.’? Or, in sum, how can the term-using animal see
around the corner of his terminology?” (ts5). Such logological translations
continue to appear throughout the remaining pages of Burke’s typescript:

13

Michalson, Carl. “What Is Existentialism?”: 21–22.
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Existentialism as philosophy can be read like Christian theology for what
it says by analogy about the use and abuse of words.
After discussing Michalson’s introduction, Burke takes up
H. Richard Niebuhr’s essay on the proto-Existentialist, Sören Kierkegaard,
“one of the most violently anti-religious writers of the nineteenth century
and one of its devoutest Christians.”14 Here again Burke’s rhetoricalhermeneutic strategy is to show the “great dialectical prowess of this
turbulently scrupulous man” as Kierkegaard interprets human existence
and deploys his own terminology to accomplish this interpretation.
Niebuhr’s essay emphasizes the paradoxical nature of Kierkegaard’s antiHegelianism, and Burke logologically runs with these paradoxes. Burke
quotes Niebuhr on Kierkegaard: “He reacted against the systematic thesis
of Hegelianism with the antithesis of non-systematic thought; against the
thesis that everything leads to synthesis with the antithesis that everything
leads to antithesis; against the thesis that the idea objectifies itself with the
antithesis that it subjectifies itself, etc.”15 Burke then comments: “noting
logologically the ways whereby the concepts of thesis, antithesis, and
synthesis all implicate one another, should we not hesitate to put our trust
wholly in any one progression here [?]. . . . Where terms imply one another,
so that we need but look long at any one of them to find the others lurking
in it, can we not get the best results by deliberately taking various routes,
rather than by trying to treat any one of them as a complete calculus?”
(ts6). Burke’s logological teasing out of the implications of terms would
thus seem to be Hegelian and Kierkegaardian at the same time: Hegelian
in its insistence on the dialectical development of terminology and
Kierkegaardian in its anti-systematic skepticism regarding the direction of
Hegel’s specific dialectical thinking.
Moving onto Kierkegaard’s ethical focus, Burke quotes Niebuhr’s
point about Kierkegaard’s stress upon “personal existence as the clue
to being” and his “insistence that the ethical question not only takes
precedence over the metaphysical but can ethically never be abandoned in
favor of the latter.”16 Burke logologically translates Kierkegaard’s stance
into his own Dramatistic terminology, arguing that the philosopher’s
ethics follows directly from his view of human beings as agents: “For the
agent is one who acts (and the stress upon the ethical is implicit in the
14
15
16

Niebuhr, H. Richard. “Sören Kierkegaard.” Christianity and the Existentialists: 23.
Ibid.: 25.
Ibid.: 26.
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idea of action, non-ethical, non-personal things being capable solely of
moving or being moved, rather than of that essentially Dramatistic pair,
action and passion)” (ts6). Here Burke is relying on the foundational
opposition undergirding his entire philosophy of language, the opposition
between non-symbolic motion and symbolic action, and on his influential
Dramatistic Pentad: every act assumes an agent using an agency in a scene
for a purpose. Logologically restated: the term action implies the five terms
of the pentad, and each of the pentad’s terms imply the others.17
Burke gives one more logological twist to his comments on
Kierkegaard’s ethical focus when he quotes Niebuhr’s assertion that for this
proto-Existentialist “the question is not what being is, but how I can become
myself.”18 To this, Burke responds with his own rhetorical question: “But
insofar as one ‘becomes’ himself by seeking to become a good Christian,
do we not come upon symbol-using as a distinctive trait of action?” and
then explains: “For insofar as Christianity is a doctrine, a message, an
imitation guided by teaching, is it not fundamentally dependent upon
words, at least as regards most people?” (ts6).19 Unfortunately, the extant
typescript ends with Burke’s logological reading of Niebuhr’s essay
on Kierkegaard. To think further with Burke, I will need to turn more
speculatively to Burke’s handwritten notes and markings in the text and
margins of Matthew Spinka’s essay on Nicholas Berdyaev in Christianity
and the Existentialists.
We can begin with the section headings used by Spinka: “Existence
and the Realm of Spirit” with subheadings (“God,” “Human Personality,”
and “Freedom), “Existential Reconstruction in Theology,” and “The Ethics
of Creativity.” Spinka asserts that Berdyaev “derives his initial insights
into philosophy and religion from Dostoevsky instead of Kierkegaard.”20
Burke’s usual reading practice included marking passages, writing words
in the margin, indexing some of those words in his own index at the end
of the book, writing out words and notes from the index on separate sheets
17

Burke, Kenneth. “(Non-Symbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action.” Critical Inquiry
4 (Summer 1978): 809–38; and Burke, Kenneth. Grammar of Motives: xv–xxiii.
18
Niebuhr, H. Richard. “Sören Kierkegaard”: 26.
19
A few years earlier, Burke had thought in another way with Kierkegaard about
Christianity, rhetoric, and the dialectic of terms; see Burke, Kenneth. A Rhetoric of
Motives [1950]. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969: 244–56, 265.
20
Spinka, Matthew. “Nicholas Berdyaev.” Christianity and the Existentialists: 60.
I will use bold highlighting to indicate words underlined or circled in Burke’s personal
copy of Christianity and the Existentialists.
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of paper, and then typing out passages and his more developed notes. Burke
marked up the Spinka chapter on Berdyaev, indexed some marginalia, and
copied out a very few words on a separate sheet. From these brief jottings
we can see how Burke was beginning to think with Berdyaev by translating
some of the philosopher’s terms and concepts into his own.
For example, Burke circled the following passage that Spinka quotes
from Berdyaev’s The Beginning and the End:
The individual is born within the generic process and belongs to the
natural world. Personality, on the other hand, is a spiritual and ethical
category. It is not born of a father and mother, it is created spiritually and
gives actual effect to the divine idea of man. Personality is not nature, it
is freedom, and it is spirit. It might be said that personality is not man as
phenomenon, but man as noumenon, if such terminology had not too much
of an epistemological flavour about it.21

We can easily see why Burke would find this passage interesting: Not only
does Berdyaev do a little of his own logological thinking in remarking on
the “flavour” of his chosen terminology; he also introduces a foundational
opposition—individual versus person—that Burke can easily translate into
his own logological perspective. Having written “individual as dist[inct]
from person” next to the text quoted above, Burke repeats the phrase in his
handwritten index at the end of the volume. Then in his sheet of handwritten notes he gives himself instructions: “cite Berdyaev’s distinction btwn
individual and personality . . . note how this wd look from standpoint of
our definition . . . first: individuating principle of matter—the centrality of
nervous system . . . then personality . . . it is ‘freedom’ . . . ‘freedom’ is in
language and in particular the negativity of language.”22
In these notes, Burke is analogizing Berdyaev’s distinction with his
own: individual is to person as individuating nervous system is to free human
agent (and, we can add, as non-symbolic motion is to symbolic action).
For Burke, freedom is actualized in human language-use, in symbolic
action, and most dramatically in the linguistic use of the negative, the
human ability to say, “no.” He develops this argument at length in several
21

Berdyaev, Nicholas. The Beginning and the End: An Essay on Eschatological
Metaphysics, trans. R.M. French. London: Bles, 1952: 135–36; quoted in Spinka,
Matthew. “Nicholas Berdyaev”: 64.
22
My ellipses. Some of Burke’s handwriting is indecipherable, at least to this
reader.
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places throughout his work. For instance, among the analogies Burke sees
between logology and theology, the negative plays a “major role,” as he
says in the first chapter of The Rhetoric of Religion, “On Words and the
Word.” There he explains his notion of the negative by comparing it with
Henri Bergson’s chapter on “The Idea of Nothing” in Creative Evolution.23
“Surely this chapter is a major moment in the theory of language, for
it helps one realize that the negative is a peculiarly linguistic marvel,
and that there are no negatives in nature, every natural condition being
positively what it is.”24 However, Burke’s logological Dramatism lays the
stress elsewhere. Bergson “begins with the propositional negative, as with
a sentence like ‘It is not . . . .’ But Dramatistically (that is, viewing the
matter in terms of ‘action’), one should begin with the hortatory negative,
the negative of command, as with the ‘Thou shalt not’s’ of the Decalogue.”
He adds in passing that “Existentialists such as Heidegger and Sartre
should certainly be examined quizzically for their tendency to ‘reify’ the
negative, by starting from the quasi-substantive ‘nothing’ rather than from
the moralistic ‘no.’”25 Burke goes on to remark that the hortatory negative
is “basic to the sense of the ethical,” and, as we have already seen, he
logologically connects ethics closely with action and thus with freedom.26
I surmise that this concern with the linguistic negative and free
action is also what draws Burke’s interest to Berdyaev’s notion of “meonic
freedom,” a term written down in Burke’s index and notes along with a
reference to the first page of Spinka’s discussion of the concept:
[Berdyaev] derives [the term] from Jacob Boehme, who speaks of the
primeval meonic void as the Ungrund. In the beginning . . . of the
cosmogonic and theogonic processes, there existed meonic freedom
which is interpreted as an urge to be. Because it was freedom, it contained
within itself the possibility of both good and evil. Freedom is, therefore,
23
Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell. New York: Henry
Holt, 1911: 272–98.
24
Burke, Kenneth. Rhetoric of Religion: 19.
25
Ibid.: 20.
26
Ibid.: 23. See also Burke, Kenneth. “A Dramatistic View of the Origins of
Language and Postscripts on the Negative.” Language as Symbolic Action: 419–44,
which includes Burke’s declaration that “Everything that can be said about ‘God’ has
its analogue in something that can be said about language. And just as theorizing about
God leads to so-called ‘negative theology,’ so theorizing about language heads in the allimportance of the Negative” (469–70).
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uncreated. . . . [E]vil is nothing else than the abuse of freedom on the
part of man, self-assertion, selfishness.27

Burke not only circles these highlighted passages, he writes in the margins
“freedom ‘uncreated’” and “‘meonic freedom’” with a page reference to a
later discussion in the essay, where Spinka writes: “Berdyaev asserts that
the world has evolved from the primordial meonic non-being, as did
freedom.”28 Burke again writes in the margin, this time: “negative source
of world.” The phrase negative source of world is Burke’s interpretive
gloss and not a direct quote from the text. By naming primordial non-being
as the “negative source” of the world and freedom, Burke seems to tie
Berdyaev’s meonic freedom to his own claims about the originary status of
the hortatory negative.
Be that as it may, I’d like to push Burke’s tentative thinking with
Berdyaev (and my even more tentative thinking with Burke) a bit further.
Burke’s markings in another book still held in his personal library suggest
we might extend this thinking beyond the philosophical and theological
to the political. Four Existentialist Theologians, edited by Will Herberg,
publishes selections from Berdyaev’s writings including “Religion of the
Spirit,” “Personality,” and “Master, Slave and Free Man.” I’ll just focus
here on marked passages in Herberg’s general introduction, which I will
connect to some remarks on Dostoevsky and freedom. Herberg writes:
“Nicolas Berdyaev’s ethic of meonic freedom leads him to a social
philosophy that in principle disparages all fixed norms and institutions
as ‘objectivizations of the spirit,’ and yet advocates a form of economic
socialism in the interests of freedom. In effect, Berdyaev distinguishes two
types of socialism: ‘collective socialism, which is based on the supremacy
of society and the state over personality . . . [and] personalist socialism,
which is founded on the absolute supremacy of the personality, or each
personality, over society and over the state.’”29 This marked up passage is
followed by another in which Berdyaev alludes to Dostoevsky’s “Legend
of the Grand Inquisitor”: “The former [collective socialism] ‘offers bread
and takes away man’s freedom’; the latter [personalist socialism] ‘offers
27

Spinka, Matthew. “Nicholas Berdyaev”: 65.
Ibid.: 68.
29
Herberg, Will. “General Introduction.” Four Existentialist Theologians. Garden
City, NY: Doubleday, 1958: 14, quoting Berdyaev, Nicholas. Slavery and Freedom, trans.
R.M. French. New York: Scribner’s, 1944: 210. Again, I will use bold highlighting to
indicate words underlined or circled in Burke’s personal copy.
28
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bread to all men while preserving their freedom for them and without
alienating their conscience from them.’”30 Of course, Berdyaev embraces
the latter.
Herberg then draws out (and Burke highlights) the political
implications of Berdyaev’s promotion of personalist socialism. Such
privileging of the individual person requires that the State “has the duty to
guarantee the free development of autonomous life.” This transmutation
of socialist economics “into the freedom of the autonomous life” leads
Herberg to claim that “Berdyaev’s ‘personalist socialism’ is, therefore,
basically anarchist, as indeed a philosophy of meonic freedom would
require.”31 Whether Burke agrees with this conclusion is unclear, but, as
we will see, a highlighted footnote to this marked passage will help explain
a certain reservation Burke has about Berdyaev’s theological anthropology.
First, though, let me turn to one more passage on Berdyaev from
Herberg’s introduction: “To Berdyaev, the prime evil is the objectivization,
externalization, ‘thingification’ (Verdinglichung) of the spirit; for him,
free spirit is the only true reality and the only true good.” Herberg adds
that for Berdyaev, the human being, “as spirit, is ‘theandric,’ a ‘potential
God-man,’ for ‘humanness is divineness.’”32 Burke’s circling of theandric
repeats his attention to the same term in his markings and notes on
Christianity and the Existentialists. Going back to that text for a moment:
Spinka writes of Berdyaev’s agreement with other Existentialists that “the
highest goal to be attained by a life-time of strenuous endeavor,” of “moral
and spiritual struggle,” is “freedom from all external slaveries, social
as well as individual.” Spinka explains further that “Berdyaev links up
this concept of personality with the ancient Eastern Orthodox concept
of salvation as transformation of the human into the divine-human
personality.”33 For Berdyaev, human personality “is human only when it is
divine-human. . . . Human personality is a theandric being.”34 Burke writes
“divine human” in the margin and underlines its importance by including
30
Herberg, Will. “General Introduction”: 14, quoting Berdyaev, Nicholas. Slavery
and Freedom: 210, with three parallel lines in the margin further highlighting this
underlined passage.
31
Herberg, Will. “General Introduction”: 14–15.
32
Ibid.: 18, quoting Berdyaev, Nicholas. The Divine and the Human, trans.
R.M. French. London: Bles, 1949: 112, 125.
33
Spinka, Matthew. “Nicholas Berdyaev”: 64.
34
Berdyaev, Nicholas. Slavery and Freedom: 48, 45 respectively, quoted in Spinka,
Matthew. “Nicholas Berdyaev”: 64.
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a summary of the above passage in his index as “salvation as transforming
of human into theandric.”
In his book Dostoevsky Berdyaev also takes up the divine-human
relation in emphasizing the dynamic, dramatic movement of Dostoevsky’s
thought, a movement that includes the dialectical development of “the
antithesis of the God-man and the Superman [man-god].”35 We will see here
how Berdyaev thinks with Dostoevsky about this dialectic, especially in
“The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor” chapter of The Brothers Karamazov,
and then return one final time to Burke’s thinking with Berdyaev.
In his foreword Berdyaev writes, “At the base of my notion of
the world as I see it there has always lain the idea of liberty, and in this
fundamental intuition of liberty I found Dostoevsky as it were on his
own special ground.” Dostoevsky played “a decisive part” in Berdyaev’s
spiritual life, and from early on the great Russian novelist stirred his
soul “more than any other writer or philosopher.” For Berdyaev, “people
are always divided into ‘dostoevskyites’ and those to whom his spirit is
foreign.”36 He saw Dostoevsky as “a great thinker and a great visionary
as well as a great artist” and, most relevant to my point, “a dialectician of
genius and Russia’s greatest metaphysician.” Berdyaev vividly explains:
“For Dostoevsky ideas are fiery billows, never frozen categories; they are
bound up with” the destinies of humanity, the world, and God. These ideas
“determine those destinies. They are ontological; that is to say, comprise
within themselves the very substance of being, and conceal a latent energy
as destructive as dynamite—Dostoevsky shows how their explosion
spreads ruin all around.” But Berdyaev is quick to add that those ideas
“have life-giving energy as well.”37
Berdyaev’s specific aim is to represent and examine Dostoevsky’s
spiritual side by exploring how he “shows us new worlds, worlds in motion,
by which alone human destinies can be made intelligible.” Berdyaev
tries “to enter and explore in order to seize” what he calls Dostoevsky’s
“conception of the world,” a conception that is dynamic in the highest
degree.38 In its dialectical development the internal contradictions of the
novelist’s work tend to disappear. Contrasting him to Tolstoy, Berdyaev
35

Berdyaev, Nicholas. Dostoevsky, trans. Donald Attwater. Cleveland, OH: World
Publishing, 1957: 202.
36
Ibid.: 9.
37
Ibid.: 11–12.
38
Ibid.: 13.
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argues that Dostoevsky “was much less concerned with God than with
man and his destiny, with the riddle of the spirit; he was not haunted by
theology but by anthropology.”39 Dostoevsky did not strive to solve the
divine problem but the problem of humanity, which is the problem of the
spiritual, the problem of freedom, the problem ultimately of the Christian.
“Dostoevsky unveiled a new spiritual world: he restored to man
the spiritual depth of which he had been bereft when it was removed to
the inaccessible heights of a transcendent plane.” Humanity had been
deprived of its spiritual depth and was left only with its secular, materialist
surface. “The Orthodox Church began this deprivation when she relegated
spiritual life to another and transcendent world. . . . This process could
only lead to positivism, gnosticism, and materialism, that is, to the
utter despiritualization” of human beings and their world. Dostoevsky,
“as bearer of a great message from the spirit, was in reaction from all
these tendencies,” bringing back spiritual life to within human beings,
making them spiritual creatures again. He “put no limits or boundaries to
experience of the spirit” and “the scope of its activities could be observed
in the immanence of their interior movement.” Now God could be reached
in humanity and by human beings. This is the “road of freedom which
Dostoevsky put forward, and at its end is Jesus Christ,” in the very depths
of the human soul. Though Berdyaev believed that Dostoevsky “never
attained a total unity” in his religious conceptions, that he “failed to resolve
their contradictions completely,” it was still the case that “this new free
religion represented something absolute for him.” Dostoevsky’s spiritual
thinking about freedom culminated in “the ideological dialectic of the
‘Legend of the Grand Inquisitor.’” 40
Dostoevsky was intensely fascinated with the question of what
happens to human beings when, having freedom, they turn aside “to
arbitrary self-will.”41 For Dostoevsky, “freedom is the supreme good”:
humans cannot renounce it without renouncing themselves and ceasing to
be human. To the very end of his writing career, and most dramatically in
“The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor,” Dostoevsky “refused to rationalize
human society and repudiated all attempts to exalt happiness, reason, and
well-being above liberty.”42 He “found that the road to Christ led through
39
40
41
42

Ibid.: 24.
Ibid.: 36–37.
Ibid.: 46.
Ibid.: 56.
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illimitable freedom, but he showed that on it also lurked the lying seductions
of the Antichrist and the temptation to make a god of man.” Berdyaev
brackets Dostoevsky with Nietzsche in their shared rejection of traditional
European Humanism, but Dostoevsky remained a Christian, albeit of
a new kind. “For Nietzsche there was neither God nor man but only this
unknown man-god,” the over- or super-man. “For Dostoevsky there was
both God and man: the God who does not devour man and the man who
is not dissolved in God but remains himself throughout all eternity.” This
means for Berdyaev that Dostoevsky epitomizes “a Christian in the deepest
sense of the word.”43
For Dostoevsky, there is no humanity without freedom, and he
conducted all his thinking on humanity and its destiny “as the dialectic of
the destiny of freedom.”44 But in Berdyaev’s Dostoevsky, there are two
sorts of freedom and not just one: “the first to choose between good and evil,
the last in the heart of good—an irrational freedom and a freedom within
reason.” The first freedom is that of Adam, the second that in Christ. “The
truth shall make men free, but they must freely accept it and not be brought
to it by force. Our Lord gives man the final liberty, but man must first freely
have cleaved to him.” In the words of the Grand Inquisitor, “Thou didst
desire man’s free love, that he should follow thee freely, a willing captive.”
Berdyaev explains that “it is this free choice of Christ that constitutes the
Christian’s dignity and gives meaning to his act of faith, which is above all
a free act.” Human dignity and “the dignity of faith require the recognition
of two freedoms, freedom to choose the truth and freedom in the truth.”45
Freedom is not the same as goodness or truth. But “free goodness,
which alone is true, entails the liberty of evil. That is the tragedy that
Dostoevsky saw and studied, and it contains the mystery of Christianity.”
This mystery’s “dialectic works out thus: Free goodness involves the
freedom of evil; but freedom of evil leads to the destruction of freedom
itself and its degeneration into an evil necessity. On the other hand, the
denial of the freedom of evil in favour of an exclusive freedom of good
ends equally in a negation of freedom and its degeneration—into good
necessity. But a good necessity is not good, because goodness resides in
freedom from necessity.” Berdyaev outlines a history of how this dialectic
played out historically (Augustine versus Pelagianism, disputes over
43
44
45

Ibid.: 63–65.
Ibid.: 66.
Ibid.: 68–69.
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Jansenism, Lutheranism, Calvinism) and then sums up: “The spectres of
a bad liberty and a good compulsion have dogged the steps of Christian
thinkers and freedom has suffered, sometimes through the evil found
in it, sometimes by way of enforced goodness.” No doubt thinking of
“The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor,” Berdyaev adds, “The fires of the
Inquisition were the horrifying evidence of this tragedy of freedom and
the difficulty found in its resolution even by a conscience enlightened by
the light of Christ.” Berdyaev and Dostoevsky say together, “There is truth
about freedom as well as freedom in truth, and the answer to its everlasting
problem should be sought in the fact that Christ is not only the Truth, but
the truth about freedom, unconstrained truth, that he is himself freedom
and unconstrained love.”46
Berdyaev claims that “it is in The Brothers Karamazov that
Dostoevsky finally and definitively shows that freedom in so far as it is
self-will and self-affirmation must end in a negation of God, of man and
of the world, and of freedom itself.” The conclusion of Dostoevsky’s
dialectic is that developing freedom can cancel itself out, “compulsion
and an evil necessity are lying in wait for it. The doctrines of the Grand
Inquisitor . . . are born of self-will and godlessness; freedom becomes
self-will, self-will becomes compulsion. That is the process. It is the selfwilled who deny the freedom of a religious conscience and of the human
spirit.”47 Berdyaev constantly reminds us that Dostoevsky’s “treatment
of freedom is dynamic . . . continually borne along on a dialectical
movement, displaying internal contradictions and passing through
successive phases.” This “dialectic of freedom reaches its climax in the
Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, in which all problems are concentrated
and all their threads picked up and joined.”48 Berdyaev writes that “It was
given to [Dostoevsky] to reveal the struggle in man between the God-man
and the man-god [or superman], between Christ and Antichrist, a conflict
unknown to preceding ages when wickedness was seen in only its most
elementary and simple forms.” Today a human being “no longer rests upon
secure foundations, everything . . . is unsteady and contradictory . . . in an
atmosphere of illusion and falsehood under a ceaseless threat of change.
Evil comes forward under an appearance of good, . . . [as] the faces of
Christ and of Antichrist, of man become god and of God become man,
46
47
48

Ibid.: 70–71.
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are interchangeable.”49 By the end of his book, however, Berdyaev finds
no specific ethical or political instructions from Dostoevsky about how
to solve this contemporary problem. As he summarizes in his conclusion:
“I have tried to show how strong [Dostoevsky’s] enthusiasm for freedom of
spirit was, but he did not tell us how it is to be acquired, how we may attain
spiritual and moral autonomy, how as individuals and as a people we can
emancipate ourselves from base influences.” For Dostoevsky, humanity’s
“only road is through tragedy, inner division, the abyss, the attainment of
light through darkness, and his greatness lay in that he showed the light
shining in the darkness.”50

* * *

As we saw in his 1956 markings of Spinka’s essay in Christianity
and the Existentialists, Burke attended to Berdyaev’s opposition between
man-god and God-man. Even earlier, in a 1945 review of Eric Bentley’s
A Century of Hero-Worship, Burke used Berdyaev’s description to correct
Bentley’s “Heroic Vitalism.” Burke writes that “readers of Mr. Bentley’s
book might well profit by considering, at the same time, the Berdyaev book
on Dostoevsky, in which the dialectic of man-god vs. God-man is traced
at some length. Conversely, readers of that overly spiritual study would
profit greatly by considering, at the same time, A Century of Hero-Worship,
with its more materialistic, pragmatist, positivist leanings.”51 Burke’s
reservations about Berdyaev’s “overly spiritual study” also explain and
are explained by Burke’s highlighting of a footnote in Herberg’s later
commentary on Berdyaev’s “personalist socialism” and its anarchistic
political implications. Herberg’s footnote in Four Existentialist Theologians
endorses the criticism made by Reinhold Niebuhr: “A part of the claim
[made by Berdyaev] of the superiority of Russian spirituality over the West
is derived from the illusion that it is possible to dispense with legal
safeguards of both order and freedom so long as perfect love is achieved.
This perfect love is not ever achieved in man’s collective relationships;
and it is a utopian illusion to expect such a consummation. . . . The freedom
and the community which is implied in the Christian love commandment
must be at least partially secured by law.”52 But any similar reservations
49
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Burke, Kenneth. “Careers Without Careerism.” Kenyon Review 7 (Winter
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held by Burke concerning Berdyaev’s “overly spiritual study” seem fairly
minimal given the positive ways he thought with Berdyaev and Dostoevsky
elsewhere.53
Having been strongly affected by reading Dostoevsky in his youth,
a true “dostoevskyite” in Berdyaev’s terms, Burke initially emphasized
the psychological content of the novelist’s fiction as he developed his
own more aesthetic, modernist preoccupations with form as an artist and
critic.54 Later, Burke began thinking more philosophically with Dostoevsky
and with others who had done so even more deeply and insistently, such
as Berdyaev. Soon after writing the incomplete review and marking up
Existentialist books in the fifties, Burke continued such thinking in his
Rhetoric of Religion, where he logologically reads Augustine’s writings and
the first three chapters of Genesis. Defending Augustine’s preoccupation
with the “adolescent perversity” of childhood pear-stealing in Book II of
the Confessions, Burke employs his dramatistic pentad (or hexad, adding
attitude) in remarking that a person who acts “may be ignorant of who
he is, what he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, what he is doing
it with, or to what end and how he is doing it. Thus, though an agent will
usually know more about an act than does anyone else, there is a sense in
which new light can be thrown upon the act long after its enactment.” He
then adds that retrospective insights into “the psychology of the gratuitous
crime” have been offered by “French existentialists such as Sartre, and
the proto-Existentialist, Dostoevsky” and “another proto-Existentialist,
Nietzsche,” all three of whom “bring out the ways in which (as with the
Superman, or the cult of suicide) a human being attains the technical
equivalent of godhead (in being absolute master of one’s destiny).”55
As he turns logologically to Genesis, Burke works out his most
complex word scheme, the “Cycle of Terms Implicit in the Idea of ‘Order.’”
At the center is “will as locus of possible choice . . . between ‘good’ and
‘evil’” closely aligned with acts of “obedience” and “disobedience” and
53
Not long after publishing his review of Bentley, Burke shared his interest
in Berdyaev with a soon-to-be colleague at Bennington College, the poet Howard
Nemerov, to whom he might have sent Berdyaev’s Dostoevsky. See Nemerov to Burke,
19 December [1948?], Kenneth Burke Papers.
54
See The Selected Correspondence of Kenneth Burke and Malcolm Cowley,
1915–1981, ed. Paul Jay. New York: Viking, 1988: 47–48; and The Long Voyage:
Selected Letters of Malcolm Cowley, 1915–1987, ed. Hans Bak. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2014: 223.
55
Burke, Kenneth. Rhetoric of Religion: 96.
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their corresponding affirmations—“saying yes to thou-shalt-not”—and
negations—“saying no to thou-shalt-not.” The logological implications of
this cycle lead the agnostic Burke terminologically to a place analogous
to where the believer Berdyaev arrived theologically: Christ, “the second
Adam,” acts through “patience (sufferance) / repentance / sacrifice” to
achieve “redemption by vicarious atonement.”56 Burke himself provides
a gloss on the analogy I am noting here between these two thinkers. He
writes, “Whereas ontologically or theologically [with Berdyaev] we
say that by being endowed with free will man is able to act morally, the
corresponding logological statement [for Burke] would be: Implicit in the
idea of an act is the idea of free will. (Another version of the formula would
be: Implicit in the idea of an act is the idea of freedom.)”57
But the analogy here between Berdyaev’s and Burke’s paths of
thought is rather dogmatically loose, given Berdyaev’s stance on atonement.
In his Christianity and the Existentialists notes, Burke had referenced
Berdyaev’s disagreement with Anselm on the exact nature of Christian
salvation by atonement. As Spinka writes, “Berdyaev repudiates the
traditional Western views of Atonement. He regards the Anselmic theory
as a palpably objectified concept wherein the feudal pattern of justice
is transferred to God.” We might say in Burkean fashion that Berdyaev
rejects Anselm’s analogizing of atonement, of taking juridical terms from
the socio-political realm and mistakenly applying them to the supernatural.
“Salvation is not a forensic, judicial process, but is a transformation of
the very depths of man’s nature, a work of divine grace, in which the
initiative is taken by God. For ‘God was in Christ, reconciling the world
unto Himself’ (2 Cor. 5:19).”58 Burke cross-references these passages to
two others, writing in the margin: “salvation 64 (Anselm) (see 70).” The
cross-referenced passages on those pages include: “the ancient Eastern
Orthodox concept of salvation as transformation of the human into the
divine-human personality” and “Victory over evil takes place in the
depths of the human personality by the transformation of the basic
drives of the person, wrought by divine grace and results in the winning of
man back to communion with God.”59 Burke’s logology in the Rhetoric of
56
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Religion works with the more traditional concepts of Anselmic atonement
that Berdyaev rejected.60
In any case, Burke’s highlighting and copying the name of Anselm
is not surprising. Anselm of Canterbury was one of Burke’s favorite
theologians. To give just one significant example of Burke thinking with
him: Burke analogically uses Anselm (blended with Augustine) to explain
one of the most important claims of his logology. In “Terministic Screens”
Burke asserts that vocabularies reflect, select, and deflect reality for human
beings. Observations are filtered through these terministic screens. Indeed,
many so-called “observations” are just “implications of the particular
terminology in terms of which the observations are made.” Burke explains
by citing the Anselmic-Augustinian dictum that humans must believe
in order to understand:
I have in mind the injunction, at once pious and methodological, “Believe,
that you may understand (crede, ut intelligas).” . . . The “logological,”
or “terministic” counterpart of “Believe” in the formula would be: Pick
some particular nomenclature, some one terministic screen. And for “That
you may understand,” the counterpart would be: “That you may proceed
to track down the kinds of observation implicit in the terminology you have
chosen, whether your choice of terms was deliberate or spontaneous.”

Thus, for Burke, the theological injunction, “Believe, that you may understand,” can be applied to the “purely secular problem” of terministic
screens.61 This is still another illustration of how Burke reads theology,
words about God, to get insights for his logology, words about words.
I have tried to demonstrate throughout this essay how Burke does
the same analogic thinking with the philosophy of Christian Existentialism, using his scattered jottings on Berdyaev as a prime example. In his
thinking with Berdyaev, Burke agrees with the Russian theo-philosopher
on the importance of freedom. Indeed, the act of freedom, dramatized in
60

Not that Burke’s thinking about the dialectic of Christian atonement was in any
way simple or traditional. See Burke, Kenneth. Grammar of Motives: 407; and Burke,
Kenneth. Rhetoric of Religion: 181, 191, 270.
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Burke, Kenneth. “Terministic Screens.” Language as Symbolic Action: 46–47.
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Dostoevsky and described by Berdyaev, forms the very center of Burke’s
theory of symbolic action, his Dramatism and ultimately his Logology.
Freedom is the condition of possibility for human action as opposed to
mere motion, and free will is the necessary product of the cycle of terms
implicit in the idea of hierarchical order presented in Burke’s Rhetoric
of Religion. To paraphrase Burke’s famous “Definition of Man”: Human
beings are symbol-using and misusing animals, creative inventors of the
negative, separated from their natural conditions by the free use of instruments of their own making, and goaded by the spirit of hierarchy in which
they perform their ultimately free actions.62
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